It has been nearly fifty years since the collapse of the Nazi regime; is there any longer a point to presenting for the apprehension and prosecution of surviving Nazi war criminals? In this carefully argued book, Alan Rosenbaum makes it clear that there is. This book is an important contribution to Jewish and Holocaust studies, to political and social thought, and to moral theory, arguing that we must continue to pursue the prosecutorial agenda as an investment in the moral (...) climate in which we wish to live. (shrink)

According to the ethical system of eudaimonism, a philosophy that predates Aristotle, individuals have a responsibility to recognize and live in accordance with their daimon or "true self." The daimon refers to the potentialities of each person, the realization of which represents the greatest fulfillment in living of which each is capable. The daimon is an ideal in the sense of being an excellence, a perfection toward which one strives and, hence, it can give meaning and direction to one's life. (...) Eudaimonia, then, is activity in accordance with one's daimon. This is what is considered worth having in life. Since Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with the proper ends of human functioning, he rejects the view of eudaimonia as a subjective state equivalent to, or similar to, hedonic enjoyment. But if psychologists are to be able to make productive use of the Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia, it must be rendered in a form more congenial to the field. In pursuing this goal, I have found it necessary to take several significant departures from the Aristotelian perspective, while I have endeavored to remain true to Aristotle's ethical objectives. The most important of these departures is to consider eudaimonia to have a subjective component embodying the experiences that flow from efforts to live in truth to one's daimon by striving to develop one's aptitudes and talents for purposes deemed worth having in life. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In my article I defend the claim that terrorism is morally indefensible, irrespective of the religious or political circumstances and motives behind the actions of its agents and sponsors. My argument is based on the indefeasible presupposition of modern civilization and our human rights culture that, like the prohibition against murder in the law of crimes, the deliberate killing of innocent civilian non-combatants—the principle target of terrorists—destroys the cardinal value of the sacrosanctity of all individual human life by making a (...) dignified or rights-respecting, flourishing social life impossible. In my view the Islamist terrorist network of Al Qaeda (and some Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad) offers a paradigm case of modern terrorism due to the success of their attack on the American homeland on 9/11 (2001).Accordingly, I suggest the outlines of a philosophical critique of some common contemporary views which often thwart a common defense against terrorism because they blur the moral clarity of those who ordinarily respect the dignity and basic rights of persons as well as the rule of law. The views I target include a type of moral relativism, a postmodernist perspectivism, and the “Blowback” thesis currently circulating in some official military and political precincts. In addition, I explain why terrorism so deeply offends the law of war and its correlative Just War tradition; and also I reflect on why rights-based democracies must confront terrorism without subverting their own foundations. (shrink)

Enquiring into the reality of existence, Alan Bradfield draws on knowledge from philosophy to sub-atomic physics to explore such mysteries as free will, mind, matter, time and self.

This paper details a combined graduate/undergraduate course on the Holocaust. This course was designed to cover the legal, social, political, and moral dimensions of the Holocaust, as well as to familiarize students with its significant historical details and persons. Special attention was devoted to the question of why the perpetrators of the Holocaust should be brought to justice, making connections to contemporary forms of prejudice and discrimination and emphasizing that such efforts at justice are not an issue between Jews and (...) Holocaust perpetrators but a matter of upholding the rule of law. The specifics of the legal cases brought against various Nazis in order to try them as war criminals were examined through both modern and contemporary theoretical frameworks (e.g. early legal positivism vs. decisionism), and other key philosophical themes were introduced throughout the term in order to provide frameworks for discussion and critique. The author reviews course requirements and discusses the implicit anti-Semitism expressed by students, concluding with a brief consideration of the value of such a course beyond the classroom. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Both Constant and Spencer are moralists who want to encourage individual human perfection. But for Constant, politics has moral value even in a laissez-faire state, whereas for Spencer political participation has no moral value in itself. For Constant, from a moral perspective the historical change from an ancient to a modern conception of liberty is not absolute, and he wishes to retain, in a subordinate role, certain aspects of ancient liberty in modern societies. For Spencer, the historical evolution from (...) militant to industrial society involves the complete separation of politics from any positive moral good. In an industrial society, altruism has no connection with politics, and attempt to bring altruism into politics are not only doomed to failure but iare unjust and therefore immoral. Spencer is a leading figure in the separation of classical liberal thought from perfectionist morality that flourishes in the twentieth century. The separation between classical and modern liberalism that takes place in the fin de siècle is not just a matter of economics – as is shown by the fact that both Spencer and Constant are ardent apostles of laissez-faire – it is above all a question of different attitudes to morality. (shrink)